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or screw may be dropped. To guard against damage by such
accident the law requires suitable railings and barriers, a proper
width of road, and whatever may be reasonably required for the
safety of the traveller. The wisdom of these remarks forcibly
commends them to our approval.
We are of opinion that the petition contained a sufficient
statement of the cause of action, and that the demurrer should
have been overruled.
Reversed.
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ACTION.

See Partnershiy.

Case-Damages.-Where,in an action under R. S., c. 51, § 31, to
recover damages for property injured by fire, communicated by a locomotive engine, the plaintiff has an absolute title to the whole property
destroyed, he may recover for the whole injury although he held the
title as security for a debt, and had agreed that, upon payment of the
debt, he would reconvey: Bean v. Atlantic & St. Lawrence Railroad
Co., 58 Me.

And where the plaintiff had a policy of insurance upon a building
thus destroyed, and upon payment of the amount of the debt for which
he held the property as security by the insurers, he assigned to them the
statute claim with a stipulation on their part, that any excess recovered
by the insurers, beyond the amount paid to him by them, should belong
to him,--the insurers may recover, in the name of the plaintiff, for the
whole injury: Id.
AGENT.

Personalliabili&of Agent-Evidence.-A contract in writing stated
that' the parties whose names were thereto signed, had, as agents, bought

I From

W. C. Webb, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 6 or 7 Kansas Rep.
' From W. W. Virgin, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 58 Maine Rep.
'From J. S. Stockett, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 33 Md. Rep.
4 From H. K. Clarke, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 20 Mich. Rep.
5 From Hon. 0. L. Barbour, Reporter; to. appear in vol. 59 of his reports.
6 From P. F. Smith, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 65 Penna. Rep.
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and agreed to receive a certain quantity of quercitron bark at a stipulated price, to be delivered to them, or to their principal, within a time
specified. The name of their principal was disclosed in the contract,
and they therein acknowledged the receipt of one dollar, on accotint of
the contract, to bind their principal: Held: 1. That upon a refusal to
receive the bark when tendered, the agents were not personally liable to
the vendor. 2. And that parol evidence was inadmissible for the purpose of showing that the vendor had given credit to the agents exclusively, and that he looked solely to them as the purchasers : Mc Clemea
v. Hall, 33 Md.
Fraud by-Liability of Princ.pal.-The defendants delivered to
the plaintiffs (a bank) coin to be transmitted to defendants' agent,
sold and the proceeds to be passed to the plaintiffs' credit in a
city bank. The agent wrote to the plaintiffs that he had sold the
coin and deposited the proceeds in the city bank to the credit of
the plaintiffs, who thereupon credited the defendants and sent them
'--te agent's letter on which they charged the plaintiffs. After some
days it was discovered that the agent had not made the deposit
and had failed. Held, that the plaintiffs were not bound by .the
entry of the -credit and that the loss fell on the defendants: Dimes
Savings Institution v. Allentown Bank, 65 Pa.
The agent some days after he said he had made the deposit,
deposited his check to the plaintiffs' credit in the city bank, which
gave notice to the plaintiffs of a deposit of so much money. The
check was not good. .eld, neither the plaintiffs nor the citj bank
were bound by the credit: Id.
The check was not money and the agent bad no right to substitute
his check for money: Id.
Nothing but an actual and bond fide deposit of money to the plaintiffs' credit could charge them : Id.
The defendants were responsible fbr the acts of their agent, as
if they had deposited the worthless check: Id.
AMENDMENT.

See Pleading.

BILLS AND NOTES.

Consideration-IndianLand*-A note given by one citizen of the
United States, to another, for the sale and delivery of possession of a
tract of land to which the Indian title has not been extinguished, is
void: Vickro.y v. Pratt,6 or 7 Kans.
Lex loci contractus.-When no place of payment is named in a
promissory note, it must be construed according to the law of the place
where it is made: Stickney v. Jordan, 58 Me.
Compound interest is recoverable in Maine, in an action on a
promissory note given in New Hampshire, to a payee, resident there,
and made payable with interest annually: Id.
Interest- Special Agreement.-In the absence of any special agreement to that effect, interest cannot be lawfully claimed on partial prepayments made on a promissory note payable on time, without interest:
Parker v. Moody, 58 Me.
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Where the payee of a promissory note, payable on time, without
intere~t, upon being asked by the maker if he would accept partial prepayments, and allow interest on them, replied, "I think it will be
all right, there will be no trouble about it," the maker might thereby
understand the payee as assenting to the allowance of interest: Md.
BOUNDARY.

Disputed Lines.-K. and W. had a dispute as to their line; M. ran.
the line under their agreement. W. sold to S., who had a dispute wiih
K. as to the line, when by their agreement P. ran-a line different from
M.'s. In ejectment by S. alleging P.'s line was fraudulent; it was error
to instruct the jury that M.'s line was not a consentable line and had
been abandoned: Kdlum v. ,Smith, 65 Pa.
If P.'s line was fraudulent the parties were thr own back on their
former line, and the question would then be on M.'s line and would be
for the jury: Id.
A line established undera parol compromise will be supported, and is
not affected by the Statute of Frauds: Id.
See Shipping.
CONTRACT.
Efect of Rescssion.-A party having, regained possession of property,
which he had parted with under a contract he now alleges to be void
for fraud, and which he rescinds for that reason, is not estopped, while
retaining such possession, to defend his title on the ground of the fraud,
-it appearing that he retains nothing except that which was originally
his own : Aartin v. Ash, 20 Mich.
A party defrauded in a contract will not be debarred of his rights,
unless his delay to assert them amounts to a waiver, or he consciously
does some act which will prevent the other party from being put in as
good condition as he was before. A contract right to rescind may be
enforced with the same results: Id.
COLLISION.

DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.

Fraudukent Sale.-Where one sells land by parol and afterwards
conveys, no one can gainsay this, although he was not compellable to
convey: Sackett v. Spencer, 65 Pa.
Spencer having a contract with Overton for land, Forman's wife
advanced the purchase-money and the deed was made to him, he
agreeing to reconvey to Spencer which he did. Afterwards a judgment was recovered against Forman under which his interest in the
land was sold. In ejectment by the purchaser against Spencer, it was
not a question of parol trust and against the Act of April 22d 18.56, but
whether the transaction was fraudulent: Id.
If Forman received the title without paying anything, it was not fraud
on his creditors for him to perform the agreement on which he received it: Md.
Declarations of Forman after his conveyance to Spencer were not
admissible: Id.
Evidence that about the time of the reconveyance to Spencer, he was
endeavoring to borrow money to pay Mrs. Forman was proper: Id.

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.

Assignee with notice ofprior Conveance.-Ripka conveyed a groundrent to Winpenny, of which he informed Ogle but did not record his
deed; afterwards Ripka mortgaged the ground-rent to Ogle in trust to
pay his creditors who were named. Winpenny received the rent for
some years, Ogle died: Clay was substituted and received notice of the
deed. He sold the ground-rent under the mortgage and purchased it
at the sheriff's sale, the deed being still unrecorded. Clay had no better
title after the sheriff's sale than before: Spackman v. Ott, 65 Pa.
The trustee and creditors under the mortgage were in the same
situation as an assignee and creditors under a voluntary assignment:
Id.
Such assignee and creditors are not purchasers for value within the
Recording Act of 'March 18th 1775: Id.
Such assignee is the representative of the debtor, enjoying his rights
only and not representing the creditors : Id.
for value, his title was not postponed to
Winpenny being a purchaser
: Id.
that under the mortgage
See Debtor and Creditor.
DEED.
Delivery-Evidente-Presumption.-It.isnecessary, as a rule, that to
constitute a sufficient delivery of a deed, the grantor shall part with all
control over the deed, and this rule applies in all cases where there is no
evidence that tends to show that the grantor did both deliver the deed
and also retain some control over it: Burton v. Boyd, 6 or 7 Kans.
If a deed which shows upon its face that it was signed and acknowledged, but does not show upon its faoe, or elsewhere, that it was
ever delivered, be found in the possession of the grantor at the tiine of
his death, the presumption, from such facts, is that the deed was never
delivered, and it will devolve upon the party claiming that it was
delivered, to prove the same : Id.
When it is claimed, and the evidence seems to show, that the grantor,
by his deed to tbe grantee, has attempted to defraud the plaintiff, and
where the defendant holds under the grantee, relationship between the
grantor and grantee may be shown as a circumstance, along with the
other facts in the case tending to prove and explain the nature and
character of the transaction between the grantor and grantee : Id.
DEVISE.

In case of a devise over, which for any reason is incapable of taking
effect, and is therefore ineffective, it seems that such devise leaves
the estate in the first taker, the same as if the devise over had
not been attempted : Smiley v. Bailey, 59 Barb.
ERROR.

Party complain ig must show Damage.-A party against whom no.
judgment has been rendered or final order made, and who, after the
trial in the court below, moved for and obtained an order granting
him a new trial, has no good reason to complain in this court of
the action of the court below : Bunrton v. Boyd, 6 or 7 Kans.
It is not necessary that a special verdict of a jury should contain
facts admitted by the plcadiipgs : Id.
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Although it may be error for the court to give as an instruction
to the jury, an abstract proposition of law that has no application
to the case under consideration, yet, unless it be made reasonably
to appear that the jury were misled by such instruction, the judgment of the court below will not be reversed for such error : Id.
.Aew Tdial-Evidence-Jury,.-Where there is testimony, tending
to support every proposition necessary to uphold a verdict and there
have been two trials with the same result, this court will not reverse an
order of the District Court, refusing to grant another new trial,
even though the weight of the evidence may seem to us opposed
to the verdict: Pacific Railroad (o. v. Nash, 6 or 7 Kans.
Where the charge of the court is omitted from the record, this
court will presume the proper instructions were given, and on this
presumption will not examine the instructions refused: Id.
Where the gist of the action is negligence, it is not error to
admit testimony of all surrounding facts that may tend to show
the degree of care necessary in the case : Id.
It is not error for the court when informed that the jury cannot
agree, to urge them to make further efforts to harmonize, and to indicate
that they may be kept together until they do agree : Id.
Violation of Court Rules.-Although courts are the best exponents
of their own rules, yet the Supreme Court will reverse when the court
below has plainly disregarded or violated its own rules: Brennan's
Estate, 65 Pa.
A rule of court required auditors to certify with their report that they
had given notice of the time of filing. The court confirmed a report
without such certificate. The Supreme Court reversed the decree: Id.
ESTATES
"
IN REMAINDER.

Where the ultimate remainder in fee is limited upon two lives
in being at the time of the grant, it will not be defeated by the
creation and failure of an intermediate trust estate : King v..HWalell,
59 Barb.
ESTOPPEL.

Vendor and Vendee-Sale of wrong Lot.-B., being the owner
of warrant 4886, at the request of P., a surveyor, employed him
to locate it; by mistake P. located it on 4883 adjoining, and laid
out farm lots and roads. P. afterwards, in ignorance of his mistake,
bought 4883. B., sold farms on the location, which were settled and
improved. P. sold 4883, his vendees knowing of the improvements
and seeing others "nade, but not knowing that they were on 4888.
Held, that the vendees were not estopped to claim 4888. Silence will
estop only where it is a fraud; it is different as to positive acts:
Lawrence v. Luhr, 65 Pa.
Millingar v. Sorg, 5 P. F. Smith 215, s. c. 11 Id. 471, compared
and distinguished. id.
EVIDENCE.

See Agent; Deed; Gift; .Receipt.

Title-deeds in replevin, for Grain.-In an action of replevin to
recover immediate possession of certain shocks of oats, the defendant
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had sown and harvested the oats on land of which he had been
in'pQssesion several years. Held, that in such an action the plaintiff
could not introduce his title papers to show that he was the owner
of the land: Caldwell v. Custard,6 or 7 Kans.
Fact for Jury-Tnstruction.-A cash item of six dollars and sixtyseven cents, is the largest amount that can be proved by a party's
book and suppletory oath: Kelton Administrator v. Hill, 58 Ie.
Where the amount of an item of credit in a plaintiff's account,
annexed to the writ, is conceded by both parties to be erroneous,
and no specific amount is agreed upon, it is for the jury to fix the
amount from the evidence: Id.
And it is erroneous in such case to instruct the jury that they
may allow the defendant's account in set-off, inasmuch as its amount is
less than the plaintiff's item of credit: Id.
In an equity action, the court will not reverse the judgment on
account of the admission of improper evidence, if from the whole
case it appears that such evidence could not have changed the result:
King v. Whaley, 59 Barb.
Declarations.-Where one of several owners enters into the
actual possession of land under a deed which purports to convey
the entire interest, his declarations, though perhaps unnecessary, are
competent evidence to restrict his claim and show that it is not
adverse : Id.
JudicialRecords.-The enrolled decree and the proceedings in a suit
in Chancery, collected and attached together as provided by the statute
(Comp. Laws, §§ 3512, 3513), constitute the record of the cause. When
any part of it is read in evidence by one party, every other part of it,
-being properly on the files of the cause,-is also in evidence, and may
be read by the opposite party: Thayer v. McGee, 20 Mich.
EXECUTION.

See Judgment; Fartnershil.

FOREIGN JUDGMENT.

Suit on Judgment of Court of another State-Evidence.-It seems
that in a suit on a judgment in another state, the insufficiency of the
authentication of the record would not prevent a judgment for want of
a sufficient affidavit of defence, though such objection would prevent
the record being evidence on a trial: Wetherill v. Stillman, 65 Pa.
A judgment of a court of another state properly authenticated has
the same conclusiveness in Pennsylvania as at home.: Id.
- Unless
it be shown that the court was of special or limited jurisdiction no averment can be made against the conclusiveness of its
record : id.
A record of a New York court showed that the parties had been personally summoned; this was conclusive that the court had jurisdiction
of all the parties : Id.
An affidavit of a defendant in a suit on this record that he had not
been served, amounted to nothing against it: 11.
Proof of jurisdiction cannot be required when a court has assumed to
exercise it legally : d.
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The record showed that costs were included in a judgment for a gross
sum. .Reld,that the judgment was a unit, and interest was allowable
on the whole: Id.
FRAUD. See Contract; Deed; Judgment.
Bill in equity to avoid Conveyance.-A bill alleged, substantially,
that the respondent, with intent to defraud the complainant, wilfully
and knowingly made to him a series of false and fraudulent representations, specifically set out, as to matters of fact relating to the "McKay'
Sole Sewing Machine," and the "Foreign Sole Sewing Machine Company;" and, that by means of such representations, he induced the
complainant to purchase of him a large number of worthless shares in
a mock company, and to give him in exchange therefor, a conveyance
of several lots of land situate in this state, praying that the conveyance
be decreed void and the respondent ordered to reconvey to the complainant. On demurrer, Held, that the bill be sustained: Clark v.
Robinson, 58 Me.
GirT.

Evidence.-In the hearing of a bill in equity, brought to compel the
administrator of the estate of the plaintiff's husband to endorse a note
alleged to have been given to her by her husband, the deposition of the
plaintiff, to prove the gift, is inadmissible: Trowbridge v. Holden,

58 Me.
To establish a gift of the note of a third person, from a husband to
his wife, the evidence should be such as to satisfy the court not only
that the donor said and did what is necessary to constitute a valid gift,
but that it was, in very deed, his intention, at the time, to part with his
own property in it, and bestow it upon the donee, for her independent
and individual use: Id.
HIGHWAY.

Liability of Townships.-Townships are under no legal obligation
to keep in repair bridges and culverts within their limits; and therefore they are not liable under the Act of 1861 (No. 197, p. 407), for
damages occasioned by neglect to keep such bridges and culverts in
repair. Martin v. Highway Commissioners of Niles, 4 Mich. 557, cited
and approved: Township of Leoni v. Taylor, 20 Mich.

Construction of Statutes.-In the construction of statutes the intention of the legislature is undoubtedly the end to be sought; but such
construction should not be repugnant to the clear meaning of the
words : Id.
Right of Way, over a Street not opened by Public Authority, in the
Purchasersof Lots bounding thereon-Dedicationof Property to Pab-

lic use.-The owner, of certain lands lying between Madison and Druid
Hill avenues, in the city of Baltimore, offered at public auction certain
portions of them, marked in lots upon a map or plat. Upon this map
lots and streets were laid down, and among others there was one designated as Mosher street; it ran from Madison avenue, across Mculloh
street, to Druid Hill avenue. The lots advertised for sale and described
as being on Mosher street, were all between Madison avenue and McCulloh street. There was no sale at auction;, subsequently four of the
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lots, calling to bound on Mosher street, were disposed of at private sale.
Aftervwards, Mosher street, lying between Madison and Druid Hill avenues, was condemned by authority of the city. Reld: 1st. That the
right of way or easement in Mpsher street acquired by the purchasers
of the lots bounding thereon, extended from. Madison avenue only to
Mculloh street, their lots lying between these streets; and to that
extent only, was there a dedication of Mosher street to public use by
their vendor. 2d. That the vendor of the lots was entitled to substantial damages for that part of Mosher street lying between McCulloh

street and Druid Hill avenue, there having been no dedication of the
same to public use: Hawley and others v. Mayor and Council of Baltimore, 33 Md.
The purchaser of a lot calling to bound on a street not yet opened
by the public authorities, is entitled to a right of way over it, if it be
of the lands of his vendor, to its full extent and dimensions only until
it reaches some other street or public way: Id.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
Wife's separate Estate- Presumption as to Husband's use of-The

only rule as to proof to fix liability on a husband for his wife's money
received by him, is that it must be sufficient to satisfy the tribunal that
it preponderates over all theories to the contrary: Young's Estate,
65 Pa.
When the prima facies is that the money was received for the wife's
use, the burden is on the husband to show the contrary: Id.
An executor in the wife's presence delivered to her husband her dist ributive share in money and securities, he collected the securities.
Held, to be constructive evidence -that he intended to use the money. as

his own: 11.
The silence of a wife at the time her husband receives her mouiey is
not sufficient to raise the presumption of a gift to him: 11.
When the husband receives a wife's money, the presumption is that
he receives it as hers: 1d.
INTEREST.

See Bills and Notes; Foreign Judgment.
JUDGMENT.

Erroneous not Void.-An erroneous judgment or execution is
not void; it can be set aside only by direct action by parties having
an interest in it and not by collateral attack in any other proceeding:
Wilkinson's Appeal, 65 Pa.
No one but the defendant in an irregular execution can take advantage of its irregularity: Id.
If he does not object he stands as consenting, and as to him
the maxim consensus tollit errorem controls: Rd.
An award of arbitrators as soon as filed has the form and substance
of a judgment, and continues so till reversed on appeal: Id.
An award of arbitrators was filed and execution immediately issued
on it; the defendant not objecting. Held, that the proceeds of sale
were properly awarded to the execution, notwithstanding the objections of subsequent execution creditors: Id.
Fraud--Vacation-Where a party obtains a judgment by his own
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wilful perjury, or the use of false testimony which he knows at the
time to be false, he practises a fraud for which the judgment may be
vacated: Laithe v. McDonald, 6 or 7 Kans.
JURY.

See Error.

LANDLORD AND TENANT.

Lease-Re ftsal of Wfe tojoin.-Tatham and Waite executed a lease
of Waite's land, it was left with Waite for his wife's acknowledgment
which she declined. Held, that Tatham was not bound to accept nor
Waite to deliver it: Tatham v. Lewis, 65 Pa.
When his wife refused, Waite had a right to destroy the lease: Id.
Lewis and Tatham had been in negotiation to embark together in the
purchase of mining rights; Lewis afterwards bought the land for which
Waite had executed the lease to Tatham; the master found that it was
not the understanding that Lewis's operations should be for the joint
interest of himself and Tatham. field, there being no confidential relation between them. Lewis, by notice of the inoperative lease of Waite,
could not be affected with an equity for Tatham : ID.
Waite after the sale to Lewis destroyed the lease; that would not
have destroyed the term had the lease been valid: Id.
Tatham could have compelled Waite to execute another, and if Lewis
had been affected with notice of its existence, he could have been compelled to confirm it: Id.
Statute of VIII. Anne, Chap. 14, sect. 1-Attachment on Warrant
-Sheriff protected by an Order of the Court-Remedy of the Landlord for arrearagesof rent.-Under an attachment on warrant and the
order of the Court thereon, certain goods and chattels of a tenant were
seized and sold by the sheriff, without paying the arrears of rent due
the landlord, after notice given under the Statute of VIII. Anne, chap.
14, sect. 1. In an action against the sheriff by the landlord, Held:
1. That au attachment on warrant was not an execution within the
meaning of the Statute of VIII. Anne, ch. 14, sect. 1. 2. That the
order of the court directing the sale of the property seized by the sheriff, fully justified him in making the sale, and he was not liable to any
one for so doing. 3. That the landlord having a guasi lien on the goods
of his tenant subject to distress, for arrearages of rent, was entitled to
claim out of the proceeds of the sale made by the sheriff, such an
amount of rent in arrear as he could have legally demanded if the
goods had been taken on execution ; and his claim, if properly established, would have taken precedence of the debt for which the attachment issued: Thomson v. Baltimore and Susguehanna Steam Co., 33
Bld.
LEASE.

See Landlord and Tenant.

LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF.

Death of Party-Acknocledgment.-The death of a creditor does
not suspend the running of the Statute of Limitations against his claim
when the statute has once begun to run: Creen, Administratorv. Goble,
6 or 7 Kans.
The acknowledgment of a debt required to take a claim out of the.
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Statute of Limitations must be in writing, and signed by the party to be
charged therewith : Id.
NAVIGABIE

WATERS.

Sunken Vessel-Duties of Owner-Removal of Obstructions from
Navigable Waters.-An owner is not liable to raise or remove the hulk
of a worthless wreck, sunk in navigable waters, nor is he liable for
injuries to other navigators: Winpenny y. Philadelphia,65 Pa.
If instead of abandoning a sunken vessel the owner retains such poisession and control of it as it is susceptible of, he is bound to exercise
a reasonable degree of diligence in removing it: Id.
If he attempts to remove the wreck and fails, the inadequacy of the
means will not be proof of negligence: ITd.
A municipal corporation through which a stream passes, is not bound
to keep it in a navigable condition: Id.
The obligation of removing obstructions, &c., from navigable streams
it upon the state or United States, according as they may be confined
within state limits or extending beyond and necessary for interstate
commerce: Id.
Such obligation cannot be enforced against the will of the state: Id.
By the 28th section of the Consolidation Act the councils of Philadelphia are required to keep the "navigable waters" within its limits
clear: Id.
"Navigable waters" intended are those without the wharf lines, and
the city is liable for negligence in not removing obstructions from
them: Id.
NEoLIaxNCE.

See Action.

Action on the Case.-Injuriesto Property by infectin.m-A party, who
being allowed to remain on land, under a mere license, so uses it as to
make it the means of communicating an infectious disease to cattle, will
be held liable in damages for all the injury thus occasioned to the
property of the owner or licensor of the premises : such owner being
ignorant of the danger to which his property was exposed: Eaton v.
Winnie, 20 Mich.
Deceit as affecting the question of Negligence.-Where one assumes
to have knowledge of a subject of which another may be ignorant, and
knowingly makes false statements regarding it, upon which the other
relies to his injury, the party who makes such statements will not be
heard to say that the person who took his word and relied upon it, was
guilty of such negligence, as to be precluded from recovering compensation for injuries which were inflicted on him under cover of the falsehood : Id.
In towing Boats.-The owner of a steamer engaged in towing boats
on a lake and river is not responsible for an injury to one of the boats,
while in tow of the steamer, without proof of actual negligence or want
of ordinary care and skill: Taft v. Carter, 59 Barb.
Where the navigation was dangerous, and experienced men differed
as to the comparative safety of two plans proposed for making up a
tow, in order to pass it safely between the piers of a bridge on the
*river: f1eld, that the owners of the steamer towing it were not to be
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deemed guilty of negligence, or want of ordinary care or skill, although
the jury should believe, upon the evidence, that the captain omitted to
adopt the safest plan: Id.
OFFICER.
De facto-Under color of Title.-Salaries of Oieers.-A person
actually obtaining office, with the legal indicia of title, is a legal officer
until ousted, so far as to render his official acts as valid as if his title
were not disputed.: Board of Audifors of Wayne County v. Benoit,
20 Mich.
No claim can be enforced against a county for the salary or perquisites of a county officer, except for a period during which the claimant
was the actual incumbent: 1d.
PAYMENT.

Appropriation of.-If enough of the payments made on an account
be subsequently applied by the creditor to liquidate the items considting
of liquors sold in violation of law; and a statement of the account,
omitting therefrom the liquor items, and their equivalent in credits, be
sent to the debtor, who thereupon replies that he will pay the samethe appropriations will be deemed made by mutual assent; and they cannot be revoked without such assent: Plummer v. Erskine, 58 Me.
PARTNERSHIP.

Balance between Partners.-Assumpsitwill lie for a balance struck
between partners: Knerr v. Hoffman, 65 Pa.
If a balance be not struck, account render is the remedy unless
the partnership be a single transaction: Id.
"Debt," in the Act of June 16th 1836, § 35 (Attachment Execution,) will not extend to balance on an unsettled partnership account: Id.
Neither the Act of April 4th 1831, § 1, nor the Act of October
13th 1840, § 18 (Account Render), have any application to a
proceeding by attachment: Id.
The defendant in foreign attachment in account render is not
necessarily a party in the scire facias against the garnishee, nor
is a non-resident defendant partner in an attachment execution: Id.
A creditor of a partner may sell all his interest in the partnership,
and the sheriff's vendee can proceed by account render or bill in
equity against the other partner: Id.
A balance struck between partners may be attached without an
express promise to pay it: Al.
PLEADING.

,Sufficientaverments to sustain Action-Amendment.--A petition which
states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, must be held sufficient on an objection to the introduction of any evidence under it,
however informal, indefinite and uncertain it may be in some of its
statements of facts: .itzpatrick v. Gebhart, 6 or 7 Kaps.
A petition which states that the defendant committed certain injuries
to and upon the real estate of the plaintiff, is not insufficient because
it does not state that the plaintiff was in the possession of such real
estate : Id.
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Amendments of pleadings may be made in three ways, subject to the
discretion of the court: IPirse, By interlineation.
Second, By writing
the amendment (and the amendment only) on a separate piece of paper,
and referring to the original. Third, By rewriting the original pleading and incorporating the amendment in it; and when the amendment
is short, and scarcely if at all material, the court does not abuse its
discretion by allowing the amendment to be made by interlineation: Id.
Stifficiency of Averments of Cause of Action.-After answer filed,
an objection to a petition that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action is good only when there is a total failure to
allege some matter essential to the relief sought, and is not good when
the allegations are simply incomplete, indefinite, or statements of conclusions of law: Laithe v. .McDonald,6 or 7 Kans.
RECEIPT.

Contradictionof-A receipt is open to contradiction, explanation, or
correction, and may be shown to have been given under a mistake either
of fact or of law: Russel v. Church, 65.
RECORD.

See Evidence.

REMOVAL OF CAUSES.
State and Territorial Courts.-The courts of the state cannot take
cognisanee of causes that were pending in the courts of the territory,
until provision is made by law for their transfer to the state courts:
McCollom v. Ppe, 6 or 7 Kans.
There is no law for the removal to the state courts of causes cognisable in the district or circuit courts of the United States : Id.
SHIPPING.
Responsibility of the Master of a Vessel for necessary SuppliesInterest of the Owners of a Vessel in the Freight.-Supplieswere furnished for a schooner which was hired under a contract with the
owners, known as a "lay," the terms of which were that the master
should victual and man the vessel, and after all port charges were deducted, he should receive one-half of the freights. The existence of
the contract was known to the parties who furnished the supplies for
the vessel. The account for the supplies was kept against the schooner
and owners. An attachment was issued by the parties who furnished
the supplies, against the master of the vessel, a non-resident, and laid
in the hands of persons who had chartered the vessel from the.master
in his own name. At the time of laying the attachment there was a
net balance in the hands of the garnishees for freight due on the
charter-party, more than the claim for Supplies; and at the same date
the mnaster was indebted to the owners of the vessel on account of freights
earned under the contract with them, to an amount greater than that
due by the garnishees on the charter-paty. Before the laying of the
attachment, the owners of the vessel notified the garnishees not to pay
the master any more of the freight then due. .Held: That the master,
and not the owners, was responsible for the supplies furnished to the
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vessel. That the balance of the freight in the hands of the garnishees,
due on the charter-party, was not the rightful property of the master,
and therefore not subject to the attachment: Stirling v. Loud, 33 Mid.
Collision of Vessels--!Duties of Steamers and Sailing-Vessels.-Whenever a sailing-vessel and a steamer are proceeding in such directions as
to involve risk of collision, it is the duty of the steamer to keep out of
the way of the sailing-vessel, and of the sailing-vessel to hold her course:
P. W. & B. R. R. Co. v. Kerr, 33 Md.
This rule is a general one not depending on the length of route of the
steamer, or Whether it be. up, or down, or across, a navigable stream;
and it applies to the case of a steamer transporting a train of cars with
passengers, across a river at a railway connection: Id..
There may be dangers and difficulties which will excuse the violation
of the rule, and then it will be left to the jury to determine if any surrounding circumstances existed to justify a departure from it: .d.
If the sailing-vessel conform to the rule and keep her course, she is
not guilty of want of ordinary care, or contributory negligence, even
when she might possibly have avoided a collision by casting anchor, or
turning her course: Id.
It is the duty of steam-vessels navigating waters, where sailing-vessels
are often met with, to keep a trustworthy and constant lookout besides
the helmsman: Id.
TENANT IN COMMON.
Possession.-Whereone of several owners enters into actual possession of land, under a deed which purports to convey the entire
interest, it -will not be presumed, without other evidence, that his
possession is hostile to the remaining owners: King v. Whale/y, 59 Barb.
TITLE.

See Action; Evidence.

TRADE-MARK.
ProPertyin-njunction-Account.-One tradesman has no right to
use the trade-marks or names previously pdopted and used by another,
so as to induce purchasers to believe contrary to the fact, that they are
buying the articles to which the marks were originally applied: Stonebraker v. Slonebraker, 33 Md.
Trade-marks are property, and a person using such marks without the
sanction and authority of the owner, will be restrained by injunction,
even -where it does not appear there was any fraudulent intent in their
use, and will be required to account for the profits derived from the sale
of goods so marked: h.
S. having engaged in the manufacture of various medicines and other
preparations, adopted and used thereon certain labels and trade-marks
to distinguish his medicines and preparations from all others. These
labels and trade-marks were generally known to the trade and consumers,
so that by them the preparations were'recognised, distinguished and
bought. The manufacture and sale of these preparations had become
the source of' profit and emolument to S. Certain persons thereupon
fraudulently engaged in the manufacture of medicines and other preparations, and sold large quantities thereof, with labels and trade-marks
corresponding with those used by S., or with only a colorable difference,

